The Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 was not only a struggle for political independence from West Pakistan but also a test of international alliances and ideological solidarities, particularly within the Muslim world. This article critically examines the role of the Arab world and the Qawmi religious factions during the war. It sheds light on the geopolitical motivations, religious biases, and diplomatic stances that shaped the responses—or lack thereof—of Arab states and Islamic organisations during one of South Asia’s most traumatic historical episodes.
The narrative of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War is often dominated by regional dynamics involving India, Pakistan, and the then-Soviet Union. However, the silence—or, in some cases, complicity—of the Arab world and certain Qawmi Islamic groups during this genocide merits rigorous academic scrutiny. Despite a shared religious identity, the Arab-Muslim world predominantly aligned with Pakistan, often disregarding the mass atrocities committed against Bengali Muslims and Hindus. This article seeks to unpack the political and ideological underpinnings of such alignment and the implications it carried for post-war diplomatic relations.
Table of Contents
Saudi Arabia: The Vanguard of Pro-Pakistani Sentiment
Saudi Arabia remained one of the most vocal supporters of Pakistan throughout the prelude, course, and immediate aftermath of the Bangladesh Liberation War. It justified Pakistan’s military crackdown in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) as a legitimate Islamic struggle, often using theological phrases such as “Jihad fi Sabilillah” (Holy War in the Path of God). This support continued unabated until the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, after which Saudi Arabia finally recognised Bangladesh as a sovereign nation. Prior to this, Bangladeshi Muslims were even denied pilgrimage access to Mecca, indicating a form of theological delegitimisation of the new state.
Egypt: A Case of Strategic Neutrality
Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat, initially extended support to Pakistan during the early months of 1971. By mid-year, however, the country adopted a more neutral stance, influenced by its growing ties with the Soviet Union and India. Despite this geopolitical shift, Egypt stopped short of officially recognising Bangladesh during the war or overtly condemning Pakistan’s genocidal campaign. The hesitancy was largely attributed to its close alliance with other pro-Pakistani Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Jordan: Ideological and Military Patronage of Pakistan
Jordan’s support for Pakistan in 1971 was profound and unambiguous. Pakistani military personnel had been providing training to Jordanian forces since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In July 1971, Jordan’s High Commissioner visited Dhaka and declared that a “united Pakistan” was essential to maintain Muslim strength in the conflict against Israel. The Jordanian government even dismissed reports of genocide as “Indian propaganda,” thereby actively contributing to international misinformation about the crisis.
Iraq: Between Soviet Friendship and Islamic Brotherhood
Iraq’s position was somewhat ambivalent. While it maintained strong ties with the Soviet Union—an ardent supporter of Bangladesh—it also preserved cordial relations with Pakistan. Though Iraq refrained from explicitly endorsing the massacres, an official telegram dated 28 April 1971 stated that Iraq understood Pakistan’s “military efforts to maintain national unity,” thereby offering implicit support.
Palestine and the PLO: A Disappointment in Solidarity
Given the widespread support that the Bengali people had historically shown for the Palestinian cause, there were strong expectations that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Yasser Arafat would reciprocate with solidarity during the Bangladesh crisis. Unfortunately, the PLO adopted a position of silence during the initial months of the war. The Grand Mufti of Palestine, Amin al-Husseini, even condemned Indian involvement in East Pakistan, framing it as unwarranted interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.
However, following the events of Black September (1970)—a civil conflict between the Jordanian monarchy and Palestinian groups—relations between Pakistan and the Palestinian movement grew strained. Pakistan’s support for the Jordanian monarchy during the conflict led to a shift in the PLO’s position. By July 1971, there were indications that Palestinian sympathies had begun to lean towards the Bengali cause.
Libya: Sanctuary for the Assassins
Libya remained a staunch ally of Pakistan throughout the war. This allegiance was further underscored in the post-independence period when Libya provided sanctuary to some of the individuals involved in the 1975 assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Such actions were consistent with Libya’s broader strategy of supporting Islamic nationalist regimes, even at the expense of moral accountability.
Syria: Conditional Criticism
Syria’s position closely mirrored that of Egypt due to its membership in the short-lived United Arab Republic (UAR). Initially adopting a neutral stance, Syria expressed mild criticism of Pakistan’s military actions following a diplomatic engagement with India’s agriculture minister. However, during official proceedings at the United Nations in October 1971, Syria still endorsed the notion of a united Pakistan.
Israel: A Silent Offer of Recognition
Ironically, while the Arab world largely rallied behind Pakistan, Israel—despite being viewed with suspicion by much of the Muslim world—allegedly expressed an informal willingness to recognise Bangladesh in April 1971. However, the Mujibnagar Government, then under acting foreign minister Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, rejected any overture from Israel, opting instead to wait for recognition from the Arab and Islamic nations. This decision was influenced by the aspiration to gain legitimacy within the broader Muslim world, an expectation that was ultimately met with deep disappointment.
The Arab world’s direct and indirect support for Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War reveals a disturbing instance of ideological bias overriding humanitarian principles. The theological narrative of Muslim unity, upheld by Qawmi groups and Arab regimes alike, led to the denial of agency and humanity to Bengali Muslims—labelled unworthy of solidarity due to their political disobedience. It is essential for contemporary historians, diplomats, and civil society actors to revisit this history with critical eyes, not only to rectify historical amnesia but also to inform future international alliances based on justice rather than dogma.
References (Selected)
-
Bass, Gary J. The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide. Vintage, 2013.
-
Raghavan, Srinath. 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh. Harvard University Press, 2013.
-
Hossain, Kamal. Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom and Justice. University Press Limited, 2013.
-
Official statements archived from the United Nations General Assembly sessions, 1971.
-
Primary telegrams and communiqués from the Iraqi and Jordanian foreign ministries (1971).